Origin Validation Error
The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
Demonstrations
The following examples help to illustrate the nature of this weakness and describe methods or techniques which can be used to mitigate the risk.
Note that the examples here are by no means exhaustive and any given weakness may have many subtle varieties, each of which may require different detection methods or runtime controls.
Example One
This Android application will remove a user account when it receives an intent to do so:
IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter("com.example.RemoveUser");
MyReceiver receiver = new MyReceiver();
registerReceiver(receiver, filter);
public class DeleteReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
@Override
public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
int userID = intent.getIntExtra("userID");
destroyUserData(userID);
}
}This application does not check the origin of the intent, thus allowing any malicious application to remove a user. Always check the origin of an intent, or create an allowlist of trusted applications using the manifest.xml file.
Example Two
These Android and iOS applications intercept URL loading within a WebView and perform special actions if a particular URL scheme is used, thus allowing the Javascript within the WebView to communicate with the application:
// Android
@Override
public boolean shouldOverrideUrlLoading(WebView view, String url){
if (url.substring(0,14).equalsIgnoreCase("examplescheme:")){
if(url.substring(14,25).equalsIgnoreCase("getUserInfo")){
writeDataToView(view, UserData);
return false;
}
else{
return true;
}
}
}// iOS
-(BOOL) webView:(UIWebView *)exWebView shouldStartLoadWithRequest:(NSURLRequest *)exRequest navigationType:(UIWebViewNavigationType)exNavigationType
{
NSURL *URL = [exRequest URL];
if ([[URL scheme] isEqualToString:@"exampleScheme"])
{
NSString *functionString = [URL resourceSpecifier];
if ([functionString hasPrefix:@"specialFunction"])
{
// Make data available back in webview.
UIWebView *webView = [self writeDataToView:[URL query]];
}
return NO;
}
return YES;
}A call into native code can then be initiated by passing parameters within the URL:
window.location = examplescheme://method?parameter=valueBecause the application does not check the source, a malicious website loaded within this WebView has the same access to the API as a trusted site.
See Also
Weaknesses in this category are related to insufficient verification of data authenticity.
Weaknesses in this category are related to the "Emerging Energy Technologies" category from the SEI ETF "Categories of Security Vulnerabilities in ICS" as published in...
Weaknesses in this category are related to the A07 category "Identification and Authentication Failures" in the OWASP Top Ten 2021.
This view (slice) covers all the elements in CWE.
This view (slice) covers weaknesses that are addressed by following requirements in the ISA/IEC 62443 series of standards for industrial automation and control systems...
CWE entries in this view have maintenance notes. Maintenance notes are an indicator that an entry might change significantly in future versions. This view was created...
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